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Abstract
This paper sets forth a method of compliance with the requirements of CCAR 25.901(d) and 25.903(d)(1) [1] of the 
Civil Aviation Administration of China(CAAC) pertaining to design precautions taken to minimize the hazards to an 
airplane in the event of uncontained engine or auxiliary power unit (APU) rotor failures. A general methodology 
including the safety and risk analysis to deal with this issue is proposed. The principles to determine the risk factors 
are also discussed in order to provide a practical method to decide this key factor for risk analysis use.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Airworthiness 
Technologies Research Center NLAA, and Beijing Key Laboratory on Safety of Integrated Aircraft and 
Propulsion Systems, China
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1. Introduction
Uncontained turbine engine events are a basic threat to aircraft safety. “Contained” engine failure is 
one in which components might separate inside the engine but either remain within the engine’s cases or 
exit the engine through the tail pipe. This is a design feature of all engines and generally should not pose 
an immediate flight risk. An “uncontained” engine failure can be more serious because pieces from the 
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engine exit the engine at high speeds in other directions, posing potential danger to the aircraft structure, 
systems, and the persons within the plane.
Although turbine engine and APU manufacturers are making efforts to reduce the probability of 
uncontained rotor failures, service experience shows that uncontained compressor and turbine rotor 
failures continue to occur [2]. Turbine engine failures have resulted in high velocity fragment penetration 
of adjacent structures, fuel tanks, fuselage, system components and other engines on the airplane. While 
APU uncontained rotor failures do occur, and to date the impact damage to the airplane has been minimal, 
some rotor failures produce fragments that should be considered. Since it is unlikely that uncontained 
rotor failures can be completely eliminated, Part 25 of CCAR requires that airplane design precautions be 
taken to minimize the hazard from such events.
2. Methodology to Deal with Rotor Burst
Fig. 1 General philosophy to deal with rotor burst issue
The figure above shows the general philosophy to deal with the uncontained engine failure issue. As 
shown in this figure, the fragments characteristic data is provided by the engine supplier to the aircraft 
manufacturer for analysis use. Then the fragments trajectories are studied according to the guidance in AC 
20-128A. Safety analysis is conducted to determine which aircraft level catastrophic failure condition is 
due to the rotor burst. The residual risk is then assessed quantitatively of these catastrophic failure 
conditions in the event of an uncontained engine failure. The objective of the risk analysis is to measure 
the remaining risk after prudent and practical design considerations have been taken.
For an analysis of the effects on systems due to a rotor failure the airplane must be evaluated as a 
whole; and a risk analysis must specifically highlight all critical cases identified which have any potential 
to result in a catastrophe. Such an analysis can then be used to establish that reasonable precautions have 
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A safety and a risk analysis are interdependent, as the risk analysis must be based on the safety 
analysis.
3. Safety and Risk Analysis
3.1. Analysis Steps [3]
The logical steps for a complete analysis are:
(1) Establish at the design stage the functional hazards that can arise from the combined or concurrent 
failures of individual systems, including multiplied systems and critical structures.
(2) Establish a functional hazard tree, or a system matrix that identifies all system interdependencies and 
failure combinations that must be avoided (if possible) when locating equipment in the rotor burst 
impact area.
(3) Establish the fragment trajectories and trajectory ranges both for translational and spread risk angles 
for each damage. Plot these on a chart or graph, and identify the trajectory ranges that could result in 
hazardous combinations (threats) as per the above system matrix or functional hazard analysis.
(4) Apply risk factors, such as phase of flight or other, to these threats, and calculate the risk for each 
threat for each rotor stage.
(5) Tabulate, summarize and average all cases.
3.2. Rotor Burst Safety Analysis
Aircraft level FHA
Failure condition list 
(catastrophic)
Possible due to 
rotor burst?
Safety analysis






Yes Not due to rotor 
burst
Due to rotor burstYes
No
Fig. 2 Safety analysis process
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Figure 2 shows the safety analysis process regarding uncontained engine failure. The safety analysis is 
the starting point that identifies potential hazardous or catastrophic effects from a rotor failure, and is the 
basic tool to minimize the hazard caused by uncontained rotor burst. Safety analysis is also required to 
identify the critical hazards that may be numerically analyzed, and to minimize the hazards at the design 
level.
Rotor burst safety analysis is a huge and complicated work. All the structures and systems (e.g. flight 
control system, propulsion system, fuel system, hydraulic system, avionics systems, etc.) in the aircraft 
related to rotor burst are involved in the analysis.
3.3. Risk Analysis
The objective of the risk analysis is to quantify the remaining risk after practical design considerations 
have been taken to minimize the hazard to the aircraft due to uncontained failures of an engine or APU.
For each catastrophic failure caused by rotor burst, numerical analysis should be performed using the 
applicable failure models listed below:
Table 1 Engine and APU failure model [3]
Fragment category Maximum dimension Spread angle
1/3rd disc fragment 2( 1 3 )R b+ ±3
intermediate fragment 1 3( )R b+ ±5
Alternative fragment 2R ±5
Small fragment 1 2b ±15
Fan blade fragment 1 3b ±15
Note: R=disc radius, b=blade length
However, there are also other rotor failure models available for specific aircraft systems [4].
For a specific rotor stage (i) of an engine (j) impacting a specific target (k) during a flight phase (l), the 
specific risk is given by:
, , , ,
,
( ) ( , )
360
i j k i j k flightk l
i j
P l Rf k l
SaP
φ ψ  ∆ ×∆ × × =
×
∑ ∑         (1)
With:
, ,i j k
φ∆ is the translational risk angle of target k;
, ,i j k
ψ∆ is the spread risk angle of target k. Positive angles are considered when the trajectory vector has 
a positive X coordinate.
( )
flight
P l is the probability of an engine failure within the flight phase (l). The following values of 
( )
flight
P l are assumed:
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For systems, all flight phases are considered.
Sa is the Spread angle and is equal to 6°, 10° or 30° for large, intermediate and small fragments 
respectively.
( , )Rf k l is the risk factor that the failure associated with the k target and within a flight phase (l), is 
catastrophic. 











        (2)
“m” stands for the number of engines fitted in the aircraft, “n” stands for the number of stages inside 
the engine.
After the aircraft level flight mean risk for different fragments characteristics has been calculated, 
comparison should be made to check if the remaining risk level for the aircraft is below the acceptable 
risk level criteria listed below:
Table 3 Risk level criteria [3]
Fragment category Acceptable risk level criteria
Single 1/3rd disc fragment ≤ 1/20 (5%)
intermediate fragment ≤ 1/40 (2.5%)
multiple disc fragments ≤ 1/10 (10%)
If the risk value for a certain type of fragment exceeds the acceptable risk level, design changes should 
be made. When re-design is finished, safety and risk analysis to the impacted structures and systems will 
be done again to make sure the remaining risk is acceptable.
The formulae above are derived from the probability assessment methodology in paragraph 6 of AC 
20-128A by the authors based on their personal understanding. However, for the convenience of the 
applicant, other risk assessment methods can be used for rotor burst risk analysis if they are accepted by 
the authority.
3.4. Example
An after-fuselage mounted aircraft model is used to show a practical example of the proposed safety 
and risk analysis method. Two engines are mounted on the aft fuselage. Each engine consists of nine 
rotors.
Firstly, safety analysis procedures defined in 3.2 of this paper should be applied to the above aircraft 
design. After safety analysis and possible design changes, there still might be some critical cases which 
could not be avoided due to rotor burst. 
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In order to practice the risk analysis, following critical cases identified that have potential to result in a 
catastrophic event are assumed:
Table 4 Catastrophic events due to rotor burst
Catastrophic events number Title
Event 1 Impacts on the wings
Event 2 Impacts on the horizontal stabilizer and elevator
Event 3 Loss of two hydraulic Systems during take-off, approach and landing
Event 4 Loss of two engines
Event 5 Fire ignition following a rotor burst
For each case listed above, specific risk assessment should be applied. Below is an example of the 
probabilities of loss of two engines with left engine 1/3rd disc burst (event 4). The specific risks are 
calculated using formula (1) of 3.3. By choosing to be conservative, ( , )Rf k l has been considered equal to 
1 for all the calculations.
Table 5 Probabilities of loss of two engines with left engine high-energy fragments (1/3rd disc)
Rotor stage (i) Translational risk 
angles( 1 2φ φ− )
Spread risk 




1 21.56 6 6 5.99
2 21.30 6 6 5.92
3 20.63 6 6 5.73
4 19.53 6 6 5.43
5 20.13 6 6 5.59
6 23.85 6 6 6.63
7 23.50 6 6 6.53
8 25.22 6 6 7.01
9 23.41 6 6 6.50
The probabilities of loss of two engines due to opposite (right) engine 1/3rd disc burst are then
calculated using the same method:
Table 6 Probabilities of loss of two engines with right engine high-energy fragments (1/3rd disc)
Rotor stage (i) Translational risk
angles( 1 2φ φ− )
Spread risk 




1 20.1 6 6 5.58 
2 20.3 6 6 5.64 
3 21.63 6 6 6.01 
4 20.53 6 6 5.70 
5 20.9 6 6 5.81 
6 24.65 6 6 6.85 
7 23.58 6 6 6.55 
8 26.12 6 6 7.26 
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9 24.41 6 6 6.78 
Repeat the 1/3rd disc burst model risk analysis for the rest of 4 catastrophic events in table 4. The 
remaining risk of 1/3rd disc burst for each rotor stage of the engine on the aircraft is then known. Finally, 
the aircraft level flight mean risk for 1/3rd disc fragment can be calculated using formula (2).
For other types of engine failure models (e.g. intermediate fragment, multiple disc fragments), the same
risk assessment procedure can be applied to calculate the aircraft level flight mean risk values 
respectively. 
Table 7 Comparison with acceptable risk levels criteria
Aircraft level flight mean risk with different 
model types
Acceptable risk levels criteria 
(according to AC 20-128A)
Risk values compare 
to acceptable criteria
Risk [average 1/3rd disc fragments] ≤ 1/20 (5%) 3.80%<5%
Risk [average intermediate fragments] ≤ 1/40 (2.5%) 2.77%>2.5%
Risk [average multiple disc fragments] ≤ 1/10 (10%) 1.88%<10%
Above is an example of the comparison of aircraft level flight mean risk value for different fragments 
sizes to the criteria in AC 20-128A. In the table, the value of risk for average intermediate fragments 
exceed the acceptable risk level, that means the current aircraft design is not acceptable and design 
change should be made based on the rotor burst methodology.
3.5. Principles to Determine the Risk Factor
Risk factor is a key input for risk analysis and has a great impact on the results of the risk level 
calculation for certain aircraft configurations. It should be determined at the early stage of an aircraft 
certification program. The use of any risk factors smaller than 1.0, such as those given as an example in 
Appendix 1, Section 6.9.1, of AC 20-128A, require adequate substantiation. Additionally, the risk factors 
that were used in other type aircraft’s rotor failure risk analyses are not automatically acceptable for use 
in the current certifying program. A thorough evaluation of the available accident data, including 
consideration of the key characteristics, is necessary in order to use risk factors that are smaller than 1.0 
on the certifying program.
If the applicant proposes to use risk factors that are smaller than 1.0, those risk factors must be 
validated with accident statistics or other accepted factor. However, for existing accident data to be valid 
for use, the airplanes involved in the accidents used for comparison must share similar design 
characteristics with the certifying aircraft where the characteristic contributed substantially to the accident 
outcome. Both favorable and unfavorable outcomes must be used. In order to assure full understanding of 
its accuracy and associated assumptions, the applicant should provide detailed data related to theses 
analysis method to the authority for review early in the program.
4. Conclusion
This paper provides a method of compliance with the requirements of CCAR 25.901(d) and 
25.903(d)(1) of CAAC. A general certification process including the safety and risk analysis to deal with 
the uncontained engine failure issue is proposed in this paper. The principles to determine the risk factors 
are also discussed.
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The fragments size and trajectory models suggested by AC 20-128A are fundamental basis to conduct 
the following safety and risk analysis. However, some events and analysis show that the debris 
trajectories defined in AC 20-128A are too narrow and should be expanded [5]. Therefore, future research 
on more accurate engine and APU failure models should be proposed to the agenda for both CAAC and 
Chinese civil aviation industry.
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